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THIS LAND BELONGS TO YOU AND ME:
THURGOOD MARSHALL AS
ENVIRONMENTAL CHAMPION
PHILIP WEINBERG*
INTRODUCTION
That Thurgood Marshall wag an Olympian figure in civil rights
and civil liberties is well-known.1 Not so well-known is this justice's
impressive record of concern for conservation and the environment.
His Supreme Court opinions, both in writing for the Court and in
dissent, demonstrate a deep and abiding concern for environmental
values. That this should accompany his lifelong dedication to civil
liberties is thoroughly consistent, for both stem from a recognition
that furnishing a better world for the future outweighs commercial
and other forms of immediate gratification.2
George Orwell half a century ago expressed this linkage with his
usual eloquence:
By retaining one's childhood [respect for] such things as trees,
fishes, butterflies.., one makes a peaceful and decent future a
little more probable, and by preaching the doctrine that nothing
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; Columbia Law School 1958. The
author teaches Constitutional Law and Environmental Law and is author of a casebook,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (Austin & Winfield, 2d Ed. 1998), and several
texts. He is indebted to Mark Engel (St. John's University Law School 2001) for research
assistance in preparing this article.
1 See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV. L. REV.
23, 23 (1991) (discussing Marshall's leading role in pursuit of civil liberties); Anthony M.
Kennedy, The Voice of Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1221, 1221 (1992) (discussing
Marshall's commitment to issue of individual rights). See generally Sandra Day O'Connor,
Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1217 (1992) (addressing
Marshall's dedication to issues of equal justice and social inequality).
2 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Conmions, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (stating that
unrestrained overuse of natural resources, though immediately profitable, leads to communal
ruin); MANAGING THE COMMONS (John A. Baden & Douglas S. Noonan, eds. 2d ed. 1998);
Jonathan B. Weiner, Global Environmental Regualtion: lnstrment Choice in Legal Context, 108
YALE L.J. 677, 694 (1999) (calling for restrictions on overexploitation of environmental
resources).
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is to be admired except steel and concrete, one merely makes it
a little surer that human beings will have no outlet for their
surplus energy except in hatred and leader-worship.*
OVERTON PARK: A "FEW GREEN HAVENS"
Early in his career on the Court, Justice Marshall wrote the
landmark opinion in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,3
holding that federal law barred the destruction of park land to build
a federally-financed highway. The United States Department of
Transportation approved a proposal to bisect Overton Park, the
prime parkland of Memphis, with a six-lane interstate highway.
The park includes a zoo, golf course, nature trails, and a 170-acre
forest.
Provisions in the Federal-Aid Highway Act and the Department
of Transportation Act barred construction of federally-financed
roads through parks unless the Secretary of Transportation found
"there is no feasible and prudent alternative." 4 In fact, the defendant
Secretary had so found in Overton Park, concluding that test was met
by his decision that it would be faster and cheaper to build the road
through the park than to skirt it. But, as Justice Marshall pointed
out, that cannot have been the congressional intent, because usually
"considerations of cost, directness of route, and community
disruption will indicate that parkland should be used for highway
construction whenever possible."5 However, "the very existence of
the statutes indicates that protection of parkland was to be given
paramount importance. The few green havens that are public parks
were not to be lost unless there were truly unusual factors
present[.]" 6 Thus, the statutory bar on highways through parks,
unless no feasible and prudent alternative exists, means the
Secretary must show far more than the mere efficiency of building
* BERNARD CRICK, GEORGE ORWELL: A LIFE 303-304 (1980).
3 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (holding it was error to permit federally financed highway to run
through public park absent formal findings that no other alternative was available and that
special efforts had been made to preserve parkland).
4 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1990) (asserting statutory purpose to preserve parkland by mandating
Secretary of Transportation to reject construction on such land unless no feasible alternative is
available). See 49 U.S.C. § 303 (1996) (stating that it is governmental policy that special efforts
should be undertaken to preserve natural beauty of countryside and public parks).
5 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 411-12 (stating that existence of federal regulations indicated
Congress' intent that these factors not have same weight).
6 See Overton Park, at 412-13 (stating that legislative intent mandated Secretary to avoid
unnecessary burden on and disruption of urban community).
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through a park.
Of even greater long-range significance, Justice Marshall noted
that in cases involving public issues, such as the destruction of a
park shared by thousands of urban residents, "thorough, probing,
in-depth review" by the courts of the administrative agency's
decision is required-the "searching and careful" inquiry that has
come to be known as the "hard look" doctrine. 7
Since Overton Park, the hard look doctrine has become the
accepted standard for judicial review of agency decisions in the
environmental arena where the stakes are high in terms of the
public impact of decision-making. 8 This oft-cited decision has
become the touchstone for the searching court review mandated
when agencies rule on issues affecting numerous lives. William
Rodgers has described Overton Park as "the most frequently cited
decision in the history of environmental law," rendering the hard
look doctrine "a tenet of modern administrative law and a catechism
of environmental law." 9
UNION ELECTRIC: "PROMPT ATTAINMENT" OF AIR QUALITY
STANDARDS
Soon after enactment of the Clean Air Act,10 the Supreme Court
had to determine whether the United States Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") could reject a state's plan to improve its
air quality on the ground that it imposed too great a burden on
polluters. Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall held in Union
Electric Co. v. EPA"l that the Agency could only strengthen, not
weaken, state plans adopted under the Act. A contrary holding
would have greatly vitiated enforcement of the statute and
subverted efforts to improve air quality and public health.
7 See id. at 415-17 (stating that Secretary's actions had to be within scope of his authority
and had to follow necessary procedural requirements to withstand judicial scrutiny).
8 See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S.
87, 97 (1983) (applying hard look doctrine to issue of nuclear waste disposal); United Church
of Christ v. FCC, 707 F. 2d 1413, 1425 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (applying hard look doctrine to issue of
radio broadcasting license restriction); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) (applying "searching and careful inquiry" standard to EPA ruling
requiring phase-out of lead from gasoline); see also Friends of the Boundary Waters
Wilderness v. Dombeck, 164 F.3d 1115, 1128 (8th Cir. 1999) (analyzing environmental impact
of permitting motorboats in wilderness area in framework of hard look doctrine).
9 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., 1 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.2 (2d ed. 1987).
10 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7431 (1995).
11 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
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Under the Act, the EPA is to identify air pollutants whose
emissions "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare," and establish a primary standard for each of those
pollutants "requisite to protect public health."12 In addition, the
Agency must set a secondary standard designed to protect the
public welfare by preventing damage to crops, forests and the like.
Thereafter each state is to adopt a state implementation plan ("SIP")
indicating how it intends to attain these standards for each of these
pollutants.13
Missouri's SIP for sulfur dioxide was approved by the EPA and
promptly challenged by a major electric utility as economically and
technologically infeasible-in other words, too severe. Justice
Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court,1 4 rejected that challenge,
holding, based on the Act's legislative history, that "Congress
intended claims of economic and technological infeasibility to be
wholly foreign to the Administrator's consideration of a state
implementation plan."15 Otherwise, he wrote, the Act would not be
an effective "remedy to what was perceived as a serious and
otherwise uncheckable problem of air pollution."'16 As he noted, the
Act's "requirements are of a 'technology-forcing character,' ... and
are expressly designed to force regulated sources to develop
pollution control devices that might at the time appear to be
economically or technologically infeasible." 17
Justice Marshall rebuffed the utility's argument that a SIP that
"calls for proceeding more rapidly than economics and the available
technology appear to allow.., must be rejected as not 'practicable"'
under the Act.18 As he noted, the provision requiring plans to attain
the Act's secondary standard "as expeditiously as practicable" (in
12 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408 (a)(1)(A), 7409 (b)(1) (1995). The named criteria pollutants include
sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, photochemical oxidants that lead to smog, carbon monoxide,
particulate matter (fly ash and soot) and lead. See id.
13 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (indicating air pollution prevention and control programs that
states are to adopt). See generally Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Centnry of Air Pollution Control Law:
What's Worked, What's Failed, What Must Work, 21 ENVTL. L. 1549, 1589 (1991) (analyzing
history of Clean Air Act's amendment).
14 See Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 270-71 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)
(Powell, J., filed concurring opinion, in which Burger, C.J., joined, which expressed concern
over "potentially devastating consequences" of shutdown of electric power plants should Act
impose "inflexible demands that may be technologically impossible to meet").
15 Union Electric Co., 427 U.S. at 256.
16 See id.
17 See id. at 257 (citing Train o. Natural Resources Defense Conicil, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 91
(1975)).
18 Union Electric Co., 427 U.S at 260.
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contrast to specific timetables for meeting the primary standard)
does not mean the EPA "may consider claims of impossibility in
assessing a state plan."19 A state is free to "engage in technology
forcing and adopting a plan more stringent than federal law
demands," he wrote-as Missouri did.20 He went on to reject the
argument that states may not adopt plans more stringent than
federal law requires, noting that the Act in fact encourages states to
go further where they find it appropriate. 21
A state, the Justice noted, may take claims of economic and
technological infeasibility into account in formulating its SIP. A
source of pollution is free to challenge the SIP in the state's courts if
aggrieved. In addition, a governor may request a postponement
from the date for compliance with the primary standard if that
official finds compliance is not feasible.22 In the end, however, the
Act mandates that "consideration of such claims will not interfere
substantially with the primary goal of prompt attainment of the
national standards." A different result, the Court held, "would
frustrate congressional intent." 23
It is noteworthy that Justice Marshall struck a blow for air quality
and public health while at the same time upholding the right of the
states to exceed congressional requirements under the Act. Though
not normally a defender of states' rights against federal power, 24 he
rose to support the states' ability to go further than the federally-
mandated standards in safeguarding the quality of their air.
Union Electric has become a major precedent in construing the
Clean Air Act broadly and sustaining the states' power under the
19 See id. at 260-61.
20 See id. at 260-61; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A) (1995) (indicating each plan shall
include economic incentives as well as schedules and timetables for compliance).
21 See Union Electric Co., 427 U.S at 265.
22 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(e), (f) (1995).
23 Uiiio, Elec. Co., 427 U.S. at 268-69. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) (1995) (listing
Congress' purposes of Clean Air Act); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. EPA, 217 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2000)
(stating purpose of Clean Air Act); Bunker Hill Co. Lead & Zinc Smelter v. .E.P.A., 658 F.2d
1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting purpose of Clean Air Act was to regulate and reduce air
pollution).
24 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Miing & Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264, 281 (1981);
Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 324 (1981) (holding that restrictions on slope mining do not
interfere with States' traditional governmental function of regulating land use); Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542, 548 (1975) (upholding federal wage law as applied to state employees); see
also Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944) (barring denial of right to vote in primary
election based on racial discrimination); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)
(demonstrating Thurgood Marshall's persuasive advocacy as counsel in racial discrimination
cases, arguing successfully that Equal Protection Clause barred various forms of state-
sponsored discrimination).
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Act to maintain and improve air quality in keeping with the
congressional intent.25
STRYCKER'S BAY: AGENCIES SHOULD REDUCE ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACTS
A long-standing controversy involving the National
Environmental Policy Act 26 ("NEPA") simmered for a decade as to
whether that statute requires federal agencies to achieve
environmental goals in their decision-making. The Act, adopted in
1969, requires all federal agencies performing, funding, or licensing
actions significantly affecting the environment to weigh the
environmental effects of those actions as well as alternatives and
possible measures to mitigate those effects. 27 The mechanism to
achieve those goals is the environmental impact statement ("EIS")
that agencies are to prepare in those situations. It was not clear
whether, having considered these environmental consequences, the
agency had to in fact choose the environmentally preferable course
of conduct. That is, it was unclear whether the NEPA was
substantive as well as procedural. 28
Some early decisions suggested that the Act had a substantive
dimension. Relying on the Act's mandate that "to the fullest extent
possible[,] the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United
States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the
policies set forth in this" Act,29 some federal courts took the view
that NEPA "makes environmental protection a part of the mandate
25 See Duquesne Light Co. v..E.P.A., 166 F.3d 609, 611 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating SIP's must be
approved by EPA Administrator if they meet minimum requirements of Clean Air Act);
Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v. E.P.A., 836 F.2d 777, 780 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding states
may make SIPs more stringent than necessary to achieve national air quality standards);
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Costle, 650 F.2d 579, 581 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting states are "at
liberty" to devise particular components of their pollution control plans, but so long as they
are adequate to meet standards mandated by EPA, they must be approved); Friends of the
Earth v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 419 F. Supp. 528, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (noting state plans
may contain control strategies involving emissions limitations more stringent than those
necessary to meet minimal requirements of primary and secondary ambient air quality
standards).
26 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(d) (1995).
27 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1995).
28 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349-50 (1989) (noting
purposes of EIS requirements of NEPA); Matthew C. Porterfield, Agency Action, Finality and
Geographical Nexus: Judicial Reviev of Agency Conpliance riti NEPA's Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statenient Requirement After Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 28 U.
RICH. L. REV. 619, 624 (1994) (asserting NEPA's EIS requirement is purely procedural with no
requirement for agency to pursue most environmentally preferable option).
29 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1995).
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of every federal agency and department." 30 The Act directs agencies
to "use all practicable means... to improve and coordinate federal
plans, functions, programs and resources to the end that the Nation
may... attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment
without degradation [or] risk to health or safety" 31 - language
suggesting that Congress intended NEPA to mandate substantive
decision-making by agencies to reduce harmful environmental
impacts.
In its first decision as to whether NEPA was substantive, the
Supreme Court reached an ambiguous result. In Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,32 the
Court found that the Act authorized the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to adopt a rule which would mandate consideration of
nuclear waste disposal questions in nuclear power plant licensing
decisions.33 This result seemingly produced a substantive dimension
to NEPA. The Court, however, rejected a claim that the
Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards should
recast a report on the risks of nuclear waste "in terms
understandable to a layman," noting that any defects in that report
did not warrant overturning the entire agency decision to license the
power plants at issue.34 The Court then added "one further
observation," castigating the Court of Appeals for nullifying the
Commission's actions based on the report's flaws, and concluding
that "NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the
30 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109,
1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (stating that federal agencies such as Atomic Energy Commission are
compelled to take environmental values into account). See, e.g., Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027,
1031 (7th Cir. 1972) (stating that through enactment of these procedural requirements,
Congress has not only permitted, but has compelled federal agencies to take environmental
values into account); Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Hills, 420 F. Supp. 582,
587 (D. Colo. 1976) (stating that NEPA requires that all agencies comply to fullest extent
possible). But see Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. Co. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP), 422 U.S. 289, 321 n.20 (1975) (questioning Calvert Cliffs' interpretation of
statute).
31 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(3) (1995). The author has urged, as have others, that these
provisions evince a clear congressional intent that NEPA be substantive. See Philip Weinberg,
It's Tie to Put NEPA Back on Course, 3 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 99, 100 (1994); Nicholas C. Yost,
NEPA's Promuise - Partially Fiufilled, 20 ENVTL. L. 533, 537 (1990).
32 435 U.S. 519 (1978), rev'd sub nora. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Defense
Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
33 See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 548; see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1996) (outlining rule-
making procedures for federal agencies under Administrative Procedure Act).
34 See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 556-58 (stating that publication was subsidiary to main
function of providing technical advice).
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Nation, but its mandate is essentially procedural."35
Two years later, with the stage thus set, the Court had to deal
squarely with the issue of whether the Act imposed substantive
requirements on agencies. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v.
Karlen36 involved a federally-funded public housing development.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
maintained it had adequately weighed alternative sites for this
largely low-income housing project. The Second Circuit, however,
ordered HUD to reconsider other locations to avoid "crowding low-
income housing into a concentrated area," holding that NEPA
provided "substantive standards necessary to review the merits of
agency decisions[.]" 37 The Supreme Court summarily reversed in a
terse per curiam opinion, dispatching the notion that NEPA contains
substantive mandates. Citing dicta from Vermont Yankee that NEPA
is "essentially procedural," the Court ruled that "the Court of
Appeals' conclusion that an agency, in selecting a course of action,
must elevate environmental concerns over other appropriate
considerations" was misguided. 38 "On the contrary," the Court held
that "once an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's
procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to insure that
the agency has considered the environmental consequences; it
cannot 'interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive
as to the choice of the action to be taken."' 39
Justice Marshall alone dissented. He perceived that the issue
before the Court was "far more difficult than the per curiam opinion
suggests," and he stated that "Vermont Yankee does not stand for the
broad proposition that the majority advances today." 40 As he
35 Id. at 557, 558; see also Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures, 422 U.S. 289, 319 (1975) (noting procedural obligation to give written
consideration to environmental issues of major federal actions created under NEPA); see also
Consol. v. Federal Maritime Comrn'n., 383 U.S. 607, 620-21 (1966) (discussing appropriate
standard for judicial review of agency decisions).
36 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
37 Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nion. Strycker's Bay
Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
38 Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 227 (citing Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558).
39 See Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 227-28, (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976)); see
also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(holding that where agency had taken hard look at environmental consequences, court should
not interject itself within area of executive discretion); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference
v. Federal Power Comm'n, 453 F.2d 463, 484 (2d Cir. 1971) (Oakes, J., dissenting) (drawing
distinction between court's deference to agency decision and fully abdicating judicial review
power).
40 Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 228-29 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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pointed out, the comment in Vermont Yankee that NEPA is
"essentially procedural" arose in the context of a "further
observation" by that Court. "Thus," he went on, "Vermont Yankee
does not stand for the proposition that a court reviewing agency
action under NEPA is limited solely to the factual issue of whether
the agency 'considered' environmental consequences." 41 He argued
that HUD's refusal to look at an alternative site because of a
supposed two-year delay of the project should be examined under
the hard-look doctrine of Overton Park.42 The courts, in reviewing
agency decisions, are not limited "to the essentially mindless task of
determining whether an agency 'considered' environmental factors
even if that agency may have effectively decided to ignore those
factors in reaching its conclusion." 43
At this crucial turning point in environmental law, Justice
Marshall alone got it right. His view of NEPA is plainly supported
by the congressional intent, expressed by the Act's sponsor, Senator
Henry M. Jackson, on the Senate floor as "a declaration that we do
not intend as a government or as a people to initiate actions which
endanger the continued existence or the health of mankind [or] do
irreparable damage to the air, land and water which support life on
earth." 44 Had this reading of the Act prevailed, NEPA would have
been a far more effective weapon to prevent environmental harm by
federal agencies. In vivid contrast to the Supreme Court majority's
narrow view of NEPA, many state statutes modeled on NEPA
expressly provide, or have been construed, to require agencies to
substantively mitigate environmental damage, not just discuss it.45
Instead, fedreal courts have continued to regard NEPA as
procedural only and to reject claims that agencies need to actually
mitigate environmental harm. 46 In contrast, Justice Marshall's view
41 See id. at 229.
42 See id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410
n.21 (1976) (stating that court's role is to insure agency has taken "hard look" at
environmental consequences).
43 Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 420-21
(Marshall, J., concurring) (arguing history and wording of NEPA s impact statement
requirement were designed to allow for development of NEPA common law).
44 115 CONG. REC. 40,41-46 (1969) (setting forth remarks of Sen. Jackson).
45 See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081(a) (West 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
43.21C.10 (West 1998); Town of Henrietta v. Department of Envtl. Conservation, 430 N.Y.S.2d
440-46 (App. Div. 1980) (interpreting N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109 (West 1997)).
46 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (stating that
NEPA requires agencies to take "hard look" at consequences of its actions in form of
environmental impact studies, but does not mandate particular results); see also Strjcker's Bay,
2000]
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as the lone dissenter would have achieved the true intent of NEPA,
and led to far more effective environmental protection by federal
agencies.
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE: SAFEGUARDING THE WORKPLACE
Another long-standing struggle in environmental law turns on
whether government agencies must weigh the monetary costs to
industry of reducing exposure to toxic substances against the risks
created by that exposure. Clearly, risks of exposure have to be
assessed. But some representatives of industry and legal scholars
have argued that costs ought to be directly weighed against benefits
to health.47 This approach has come to be known as cost-benefit
analysis, and its proponents argued in a pair of cases before the
Supreme Court that federal statutes mandated its use in adopting
regulations for workplace exposure to hazardous chemicals.
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleuni
Institute48 involved a standard adopted by the Secretary of Labor
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)49 to control
exposure to benzene, a carcinogenic by-product of oil refining. The
statute requires the Secretary to set "the standard which most
adequately assures, to the extent feasible,... that no employee will
suffer material impairment of health[.]"50 The standard is to be
determined by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
also known as OSHA, a division of the Department of Labor.51
444 U.S. at 227 (noting NEPA is "essentially procedural" and role of courts is to insure that
agency has followed procedure of considering environmental consequences but may not
interject in areas wholly within executive's disretion); Vermont Yankee Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (stating NEPA establishes
substantive goals, but imposes on agencies duties that are essentially procedural).
47 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Saving Overton Park: A Comment oi Environmental Values, 146
U. PA. L. REV. 1671 (1998) (suggesting that cost benefit analysis should include environmental
component, as opposed to just health benefits and costs to industry); March Sadowitz,
Tailoriig Cost-Benefit Analysis to Emiviroiniental Policy Goals: Techiiology and Health-Based
Environmental Standards in the Age of Cost-Beiefit Analysis, 2 B.U. J. ScI. & TECH. L. 11 (1996)
(comparing and contrasting health-based and technology-based approaches to environmental
regulation); Christopher H. Schroeder, Emivironientally Ihduced Cancer and the Law, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 1483 (1990) (comparing and contrasting zero risk, significant risk, cost-benefit and
fesibility paradigms in agency regulation of environmental cancer risks).
48 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
49 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000).
50 29 U.S.C. §655(b)(5) (2000).
51 See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(1) (1995); see also Sidney A. Shapiro and Thomas 0. McGarity,
Reorienting OSHA: Regulatony Alternatives aiid Legislative Reform,, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 9 (1989)
(describing power given to OSHA by Congress to write health and safety standards for work
environment).
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The Government took the view that the Act required companies
to restrict carcinogen exposure to "an exposure limit at the lowest
technologically feasible level that will not impair the viability of the
industries regulated." 52 Since a standard was defined in the Act as
one "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or
healthful employment," 53 the Fifth Circuit annulled the rule as
failing that test. It ruled the Act does not give "unbridled discretion
to adopt standards designed to create absolutely risk-free
workplaces regardless of costs," and that the Secretary, therefore,
had to determine "whether the benefits expected from the new
standard bore a reasonable relationship to the costs that it
imposed." 54
A narrow majority of the Supreme Court affirmed. Justice
Stevens, writing for a four justice plurality, agreed with the Fifth
Circuit that the Act "requires the Secretary to find, as a threshold
matter, that the toxic substance in question poses a significant health
risk[.]"55 Until that finding is made, he concluded, the Court need
not decide "whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that there
must be a reasonable correlation between costs and benefits, or
whether, as the federal parties argue, the Secretary is then
required.., to promulgate a standard that goes as far as
technologically and economically possible to eliminate the risk." 56
The plurality went on to rule that the agency had not adequately
shown that lowering exposure to benzene would likely reduce the
52 See Industrial Unioni, 448 U.S. at 607.
53 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1995). See generally Mark Harcourt & Sondra Harcourt, When Call all
Eiiployee Refnse Unsafe Work and Expect to be Protected from Discipline? Evidence from Canada, 53
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 684, 686-89 (2000) (discussing different standards of review used to
determine health and safety of work environment).
54 Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 614 (quoting Anmericat Petroleumi Istitute v. OSHA, 581 F.2d
493, 502-03 (5th Cir. 1978)); see also Frank B. Cross, Beyond Beiizeie: Establishig Priniciples For a
Sigtificatce Threshold on Regnlatable Risks of Canicer, 35 EMORY L.J. 1, 4-5 (Winter 1986)
(discussing Supreme Court's 1980 decision in Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Amnericai
Petrolenn hist. which focused attention on authority of federal administrative agencies to
regulate occupational health and safety).
55 idnstrial Umion, 448 U.S. at 614-15 (1980); see also Cross, snpra note 55, at 13-14
(discussing acceptable risk thresholds with regards to exposure to occupational carcinogens).
56 Indnstrial Uiioni, 448 U.S. at 615; see also Victor B. Flatt, OSHA Regulation of Low-Exposnre
Carcinogens: A New Approach to Judicial Aialysis of Scientific Evidence, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 283, 285-86 (Winter 1991) (discussing Occupational Safety and Health Act in which
Congress gave to Secretary of Labor power to set occupational safety and health standards at
level that "most adequately assures, to extent feasible, on basis of best available evidence, that
no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity"). See generally 29
U.S.C. § 655 (b)(5).
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risk of cancer.5 7 It criticized OSHA for rejecting the oil industry's
studies that indicated a level of ten parts per million (ppm) was as
safe a threshold as the one ppm level set by the agency.58 The
plurality concluded that "we have no occasion to determine
whether costs must be weighed against benefits in an appropriate
case." 59 This view rests on the remarkable conclusion that oil
refinery workers exposed to substantial ingestion of benzene-an
undisputed carcinogen- are not at "significant risk of harm."60 It set
up the straw man of "an absolutely risk-free workplace" and then
unsurprisingly concluded the Act did not mandate that impossible
result.61
Justice Powell, though he joined parts of the plurality opinion,
concurred, adopting the Court of Appeals' view that the Act
requires a cost-benefit analysis. He concluded "a standard-setting
process that ignored economic considerations would result in a
serious misallocation of resources and a lower effective level of
safety than could be achieved under standards set with reference to
the comparative benefits available at a lower cost." 62 Justice Powell
did, though, agree with the dissenters that OSHA properly found
the risk to be significant enough to justify controls. 63 Justice (now
57 See Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 634-35; see also Flatt, supra note 57, at 288 (discussing
risk of leukemia from benzene was actually much higher than studies had indicated). See
generally A List of Substances Which May Be Candidates for Further Scientific Review and
Possible Identification, Classification, and Regulation as Potential Occupational Carcinogens,
45 Fed. Reg. 53672, 53672-74 (1980); see also Regulation of Potential Carcinogens, 29 C.F.R. §
1990.143 (1990) (developing regulation proceedings for Category I and II potential
occupational carcinogens).
58 See Industrial Unioni, 448 U.S. at 634-35, 666 (discussing exposure levels and financial
aspects of new standard). See geiierally 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678; Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 508 U.S. 579, 590 (1993); Flatt, supra note 57, at 286 (interpreting
Industrial Union Dep't., AFL-CIO v. Am,,ericai Petroleuni Inst., ("Benzene" case)); Charles D.
Weller and David B. Graham, New Approaches to Enviroanental Law and Ageiicy Regulation: The
Danbert Litigatioii Approach, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10557, 10559 (July 2000) (discussing role of
Occupational Safety and Health Adninistration (OSHA) in setting limits on occupational
exposure to benzene).
59 See liidustrial Uniioni, 448 U.S at 640. See generally Cross, supra note 55, at 44-54
(discussing proposed principles for defining significant risk threshold, which includes
comparative average risk, maximum individual risk, occupational vs. environmental risks and
general societal preferences).
60 hidiistrial Uiion, 448 U.S at 642; see also Flatt, siipra note 57, at 289-91 (discussing
"substantial evidence" requirement to prove significant risk of harm).
61 Intdustrial Uiiioii, 448 U.S at 647.
62 See id. at 670; see also Texas Indep. Ginners Ass'n v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398, 410-11 (5th
Cir. 1980) (examining Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Industrial Union). See generally
David R. Cherrington, The Race to the Courthouse: Coiflictiig Views Toward the Judicial Review of
OSHA Standards, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 95, 109-11 (1994) (discussing use of cost-benefit analysis
by OSHA).
63 See lindustrial Uiiioii, 448 U.S. at 666. Justice Powell notes the requirement discussed in
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Chief Justice) Rehnquist concurred on the separate ground that the
Act unlawfully delegated legislative authority to the agency-a
contention not successfully voiced since a pair of long-discredited
decisions from the Pleistocene era of administrative law.64
It again fell to Justice Marshall to write the dissent, in which
Justices Brennan, White and Blackmun joined. He began by noting
that "a court is not permitted to distort a statute's meaning in order
to make it conform with the Justices' own views of sound social
policy" -and this "decision flagrantly disregards these restrictions
on judicial authority." 65 The result, he pointed out, will be "that the
Federal Government's efforts to protect American workers from
cancer and other crippling diseases may be substantially
impaired." 66 As he commented, nowhere does the OSHA statute
mandate that the Secretary of Labor must find a risk to workplace
health be "significant" before he can act - a conclusion motivated by
"the plurality's solicitude for the welfare of regulated industries." 67
Since the existing medical evidence may not justify the finding of
"significant risk" that the plurality, though not Congress, insisted
upon, this approach "would place the burden of medical
uncertainty squarely on the shoulders of the American worker, the
intended beneficiary of the ... Act."68
In embracing this approach, Justice Marshall adopted the
precautionary principle of environmental protection: the salutary
the plurality's opinion would be met, providing OSHA's conclusion is supported by
"substantial evidence." See id.
64 See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935) (holding that section of
National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to executive
branch); J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. U.S., 276 U.S. 394, 408-409 (1928) (holding that § 315 of
1922 Tariff Act was valid because it gave President means to execute law rather than authority
to make law). But see American Trucking Ass'n v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(per curiam) (attempting to reincarnate non-delegation doctrine by suggesting that doctrine
requires EPA to articulate intelligible principle when applying factors used to determine
public health concerns connected with air pollution), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000). See
generally 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3:15 (2d ed. 1978)
(criticizing Panamia Refiuing and I.W. Haiiipton decisions and non-delegation doctrine).
65 Industrial Union, 448 U.S at 688 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Harvard Law Review
Association, OSHA Regulation of Toxic Substances: Industrial Union Departmnent AFL-CIO v.
American Petroleum Institute, 94 HARV. L. REV. 242, 244-245 (1980) (quoting from Marshall's
dissenting opinion); see also Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 711 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Court has duty to accept Congress' choice regardless of Court's view
about wisdom of choice).
66 Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 688 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Harvard Law Review
Association, supra note 66, at 245 (stating that Justice Marshall found evidence in record to
establish that concentrations of benzene lower than 10 ppm were hazardous to health).
67 Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68 Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 690 (Marshall, J., dissentin); see also Cherrington, supra note
63, at 95 (quoting § 651(b) of Occupational Safety and Health Act).
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rule that when scientific evidence is unresolved, government
regulation should protect human health and environmental
integrity. As the Rio de Janeiro Declaration of 1992 was later to
phrase it, "[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation." 69 This approach has driven several international
agreements to further environmental protection, including the
Biodiversity Convention and the treaty to protect the atmosphere's
ozone layer from damage resulting from chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs).70
Justice Marshall, not one to mince words, went on to reject the
plurality's view of the record as "both extraordinarily arrogant and
extraordinarily unfair" - arrogant because the justices "presume[d]
to make [their] own factual findings" while they simply shrugged
off the agency's expertise.71 He then catalogued the Secretary of
Labor's consistent findings of heightened risk of cancer resulting
from workplace exposure to benzene.72 He contrasted OSHA with
statutes in which Congress specifically mandated a cost-benefit
analysis,73 and aptly characterized the decision as "a usurpation of
decision-making authority that has been exercised by and properly
belongs with Congress and its authorized representatives." 74 He
ended his dissent by describing the plurality's approach as a return
to the judicial activism of the Lochner75 era, when the Court blithely
69 United Natiopts Confirrence on Etvirom:ent and Development: Rio Declaration on
Envirome,,t and Development, Principle 15, 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 (1992).
70 See Montreal Protocol Parties: Adjustnents and Amendments to Montreal Protocol on
Snbstances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 30 I.L.M. 537 (1991).
71 See Indnstrial Union, 448 U.S. at 695 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
72 See id. at 698-99. Justice Marshall discussed studies in numerous countries showing
causal relation between benzene and leukemia. Further, he criticized the plurality's
characterization that the Secretary's finding that benzene is carcinogenic as the same
"Draconian policy," and went on to list the diverse witnesses who presented contrary
evidence. See id. at 696.
73 See Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 710 n.27 (listing 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b) (1994) (Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Acts) and 42 U.S.C. § 6295 (o)(B)(1) (1994) (Energy Policy and
Conservation Act) as statutes requiring administrative action as "feasible" and justified by
balance of costs and benefits).
74 Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 712 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Aviation West Corp. v.
Washington State Dept. of Labor and Indus., 980 P.2d 701, 711 (Wash. 1999) (agreeing with
Justice Marshall's dissent in Industrial Union, and criticizing plurality's distortion of statute's
meaning to impose their own policy views).
75 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (invalidating state law linting working
hours for bakers as infringement on freedom of contract and due process rights). Bit see
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (holding that state law making debt adjustment
misdemeanor violated neither equal protection nor due process, and stating that doctrine that
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struck down legislation to safeguard the workplace:
[A]s the Constitution "does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics," Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting), so the responsibility to scrutinize
federal administrative action does not authorize this Court to
strike its own balance between the costs and benefits of
occupational safety standards. I am confident that the
approach taken by the plurality today, like that in Lochner itself,
will eventually be abandoned, and that the representative
branches of government will once again be allowed to
determine the level of safety of health protection to be accorded
to the American worker.76
In this prediction Justice Marshall was prescient. The following
year, in American Textile Manufacturers' Institute v. Donovan,77 the
Court resoundingly read OSHA not to require a cost-benefit
analysis. In that case, involving a workplace standard for exposure
to cotton dust, the agency met the threshold finding of significant
risk imposed by the plurality in the Petroleum Institute (Industrial
Union) decision. The majority opinion by Justice Brennan leaned
heavily on Justice Marshall's earlier dissent.78
THE SURFACE MINING CASES: KEEPING WATERS CLEAR AND
FARMLAND PRODUCTIVE
During the same term as American Textile, the Court was faced
with a brace of district court decisions overturning the Surface
Mining Act,79 a first-magnitude environmental protection statute
enacted in 1977. The Act stemmed from Congressional recognition,
prevailed in Locliper has long since been discarded); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342
U.S. 421, 425 (1952) (holding that state law holding employers guilty of misdemeanor for
deducting wages for employees who take off from work to vote was constitutional, stating
we could strike down this law only if we returned to.. philosophy of Locmet").
76 Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 723-24
(1980).
77 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
78 In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan referred to the Marshall dissent in Industrial
Unio, on three separate occasions. See American Textile, 452 U.S. at 509, 511, 531 n.55. Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Stewart dissented; Justice Powell took no part in the
decision. Thus the shift to the majority of Justice Stevens, author of the Industrial Union
plurality, was decisive. See id.
79 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1995); see also Indiana v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 452, 457 (S.D. Ind.
1980) (holding various portions of Surface Mining Act unconstitutional under Fifth and Tenth
Amendments), rev'd 452 U.S. 314 (1981); Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association
v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425,435 (W.D. Va. 1980) (holding Surface Mining Act unconstitutional
under Tenth Amendment), vacated 453 U.S. 901 (1981).
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after a decade of exhortation by environmental advocates, that the
states had failed to effectively control the dire damage caused by
unregulated strip mining. These effects included, as the
Congressional findings noted, "causing erosion and landslides,...
contributing to floods,... polluting the water, [and] destroying fish
and wildlife habitats[.]"80 The mining states, succumbing to the vast
economic and political influence of the industry, either failed to
enact laws to control these abuses or neglected to enforce them
vigorously. The reports of the Congressional committees, following
lengthy hearings, portrayed "unreclaimed lands, water pollution,
erosion, floods," as well as "[a]cid drainage which has ruined an
estimated 11,000 miles of streams; the loss of prime hardwood forest
and the destruction of wildlife habitat by strip mining; the
degrading of productive farmland;" along with "landslides, siltation
and sedimentation of river systems[.]" 81
The Act is, as Congress described it, designed to "establish a
nationwide program to protect society and the environment from
the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations." 82 It
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to adopt interim rules
requiring mine operators to restore lands to their prior condition
and approximate original contour, replant vegetation and control
flooding, erosion and spoil disposal.83 Thereafter, states may
regulate strip mining through programs approved by the Secretary.
In states without approved programs, the Secretary is to adopt
permanent rules and require permits. 84
The coal producers challenged the Act as beyond the power of
80 30 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (1995).
81 S. REP. NO. 95-128, at 50 (1977); H.R. REP. NO. 95-218, at 58 (1977); see also Hodel v.
Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 327-28 (1981) (quoting S. REP. No. 95-128, at 50 (1977)).
82 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (1995). See Mullinax v. Hodel, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 520, at *22 (N.D.
Ala. 1988) (stating that general purpose of Surface Mining Act is "[to protect] society and the
environment from adverse effects of surface coal mining operations."); see also Virgitiia Surface,
483 F. Supp. at 441 (stating that Congress enacted Surface Mining Act for public good).
83 See 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b) (2000); see also Bragg v. Robertson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 642, 646 (S.D.
W. Va. 1999) (stating that § 1265(b)(3) "requires coal mining operators 'as [sic] a minimum' to
'restore the approximate original contour of the land."'); Amerikohl Mining, Inc. v. United
States, 899 F.2d 1210, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that § 1265(b) "requires mine workers to
restore the... land to a condition which supports the land's original or better use...").
84 See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1251(b), 1253, 1254; Shawnee Coal Co. v. Andrus, 661 F.2d 1083, 1086
(6th Cir. 1981) (citing § 1251(b) generally, regarding Secretary's power to promulgate
regulations for state programs, and to implement federal programs where state programs are
absent.); see also In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17722, at *4, (D.D.C. 1980) (stating, "if a state fails to submit its own program, or the state
program is disapproved, then the federal regulations govern surface coal mining operations
for the state.").
[Vol. 15:1
THIS LAND BELONGS TO YOU AND ME
Congress under the Commerce Clause and as an invasion of the
states' reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment. Writing for
the Court in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Association,85 Justice Marshall upheld the Act, noting the weighty
effects on interstate commerce identified by Congress. In particular,
he sustained restrictions on steep slope mining against the claim
that they "interfere[d] with the States' 'traditional governmental
function' of regulating land use,"86 holding the congressional power
reached these widespread commercial activities with their
devastating consequences. He went on to reject a claim that the Act
amounted to an unconstitutional taking of property without
compensation, ruling that the statute does not prohibit surface
mining but simply regulates it, thus negating the basis for any claim
that the Act deprives the plaintiffs of all economically viable use of
their property.87 In any event the plaintiffs, he noted, were free
either to seek a variance from the rules or to show the Act
constitutes a taking of a particular parcel, in contrast to this
challenge to the facial validity of the entire law.88
That this decision was not, one might say, a run-of-the-mine one
was evident in the fractures on the Court. Justice Powell concurred
but expressed great concern that much of the Act was "written with
little comprehension of its potential effect on [the] rugged area" of
western Virginia to which it would in part apply, where, he felt,
"[t]he cost of restoration in some situations could exceed
substantially the value of the coal." 89 Justice Rehnquist, joined in
85 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
86 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 284-85.
87 See Hodel, 452 U.S at 295-97 (reasoning that Surface Mining Act did not constitute taking
because owners were not prevented from putting their coal bearing land to other uses, nor
prohibited from steep slope mining entirely, as Act merely made mining companies
responsible for restoring land to approximately same condition it was in before mining
began); cf. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-63 (1980) (holding California zoning
ordinance which restricted owner's potential use of five acres of land not to be taking of
property); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (holding city
ordinance restricting owner of Grand Central Station from fundamentally altering structure
not to be taking).
88 The Court believed that if plaintiffs would have asserted their right to request a
variance from the approximate original counter requirement, or a waiver from the surface
mining restrictions, a mutually acceptable solution could have been reached. See Hodel, 452
U.S. at 297.
89 See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 307 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell contended that the
Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1. § 8, cl. 3, "over many
years," had undoubtedly given Congress the power to enact such legislation as the Surface
Mining Act. See id. at 305. Justice Powell refused to consider the taking question for the reason
the plaintiffs had not identified a single piece of property which had been taken by the Act.
See id. However, he seemed sympathetic to the miners' plight by noting Virginia's most
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large measure by Chief Justice Burger, also concurred but cautioned
at some length that "Congress in regulating surface mining has
stretched its authority to the 'nth degree[.]" 90
Justice Marshall again wrote for the Court in Hodel v. Indiana,91
upholding the Act against a claim that its provisions requiring mine
operators to restore prime farmland to equal or higher levels of
yield exceeded congressional power. He held "Congress was
entitled to find that the protection of prime farmland is a federal
interest that may be addressed through Commerce Clause
legislation." 92 As he pointed out, "Congress adopted the Surface
Mining Act in order to ensure that production of coal for interstate
commerce would not be at the expense of agriculture, the
environment, or public health and safety[.]"93 Justice Rehnquist and
Chief Justice Burger again concurred on narrower grounds.94
These decisions allowed the Surface Mining Act, legislation vital
to safeguarding the water, hillsides and farmland of several states,
including scenic Virginia and West Virginia, to take effect
unimpeded. The Act has saved huge acreage of agricultural land
from destruction and protected mountains, rivers, streams, fish and
wildlife habitat, as well as lifting an enormous political barrier that
had thwarted state legislation to control the ravages of uncontrolled
strip-mining.
JAPAN WHALING: SAVING A SPECIES
Since 1946, the United States, together with the other nations that
valuable resource, bituminious coal, was found in a region marked by steep slopes, and that
the value of this land, which brings a two billion dollar industry to an otherwise
impoverished area, lies solely with the coal produced there. See id. at 306-07.
90 See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 311 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist detailed, in a
case by case analysis, how congressional power under the Commerce Clause has grown over
the years by way of the Court's decisions, in light of which he felt compelled to concur. See id.
at 307-13. His dissatisfaction with the Court's repeated expansion of the Commerce Clause
compelled him to write "[olne could easily get the sense from this Court's opinions that the
Federal system only exists at the sufferance of Congress." See id. at 307.
91 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
92 Hodel, 452 U. S. at 324 (challenging legislation as violating Commerce Clause only if
there is no rational basis for finding that regulated activity affects interstate commerce); see
also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 258-59 (1964) (holding that Congress could have rationally concluded that
regulated activity affects interstate commerce); cf. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971)
(upholding portion of Consumer Credit Protection Act which criminalized 'loan-sharking'
activities on rationale that such activities may have adverse effect on interstate commerce).
93 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 329.
94 See id. at 305, 307 (Rehnquist, J. and Burger, C.J., concurring).
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had historically engaged in whaling, has been a party to the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. The
Agreement limits the number of whales that may be killed,
recognizing the threat of continued whaling to their existence. It is
enforceable in the United States through the Pelly Amendment to
the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967, which directs the Secretary
of Commerce to certify to the President whenever a country's
citizens act to "diminish the effectiveness of an international fishery
conservation program[.]" 95 The President then may order the
Secretary of the Treasury to bar any imports of fish products from
the offending country.96
Japan's repeated violations of quotas set by the International
Whaling Commission under the treaty prompted the Secretary of
Commerce to certify these offenses to the President. However, no
action was taken. In response, Congress adopted the Packwood
Amendment, explicitly requiring the Government to reduce by half
an offending nation's fishery allocation within the United States'
fishery conservation zone.97
In 1984, Japan derailed this process through an agreement with
the Secretary of Commerce. In return for Japan's pledge to meet the
Commission's limits in the future, the Secretary of Commerce
agreed that Japan's limited short-term whaling, though clearly in
excess of the treaty's levels, would not "diminish the effectiveness"
of the treaty. This led to a suit by conservation groups claiming
Japan's violations did diminish the treaty's effectiveness, and
therefore the Secretary of Commerce was required by the statute to
so certify, triggering the sanctions.
The Court ruled, 5 to 4, in Japan Whaling Association v. American
Cetacean Society, 98 that the Secretary's obligation to certify Japan's
violations to the President was not mandatory. Justice White wrote
for the Court that the Secretary had discretion to decide whether to
certify violations to the President. Congress, he concluded, had
neither defined "diminish the effectiveness" nor expressly
mandated certification. 99
95 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(1) (1995).
96 See 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(4).
97 See 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(B) (1995).
98 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
99 See Japan Whaling Ass'n., 478 U. S. at 222-23 (holding that no statutory definition exists
for "diminishes the effectiveness" for Secretary to use in making certification decision and
that statutory language does not direct automatic certification).
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Justice Marshall wrote for the four dissenters.100 His opinion
began:
Since 1971, Congress has sought to lead the world, through the
repeated exercise of its power over foreign commerce, in
preventing the extermination of whales and other threatened
species of marine animals. I deeply regret that it will now have
to act again before the Executive Branch will finally be
compelled to obey the law.101
In his view, the majority "reached an erroneous conclusion on a
matter of intense worldwide concern." 102 As he noted, the Secretary
of Commerce himself had found Japan's excess whaling did
diminish the treaty's effectiveness. The Secretary then backtracked,
concluding that even though Japan had diminished the effectiveness
of the treaty, "he would prefer to impose a penalhy different from
that which Congress prescribed[.]"10 3 In short, "[tihe Secretary
would rewrite the law," and the majority opinion endorsed that
revision.104 The result, as he pointed out, was "that this Court is
empowering an officer of the Executive Branch, sworn to uphold
and defend the laws of the United States, to ignore Congress'
pointed response" to the threatened extinction of these majestic
species.1 05
CONCLUSION
This evidence of Justice Marshall's deep and abiding concern for
the environment is corroborated by other examples. In Gwaltney of
Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,106 he wrote for the Court that
a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act 107 requires the plaintiff to
100 See id. at 241. Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Rehnquist joined in his opinion.
101 See id. at 241-42 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also National Association of Home
Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (validating congressional use of
Commerce Clause in attempt to protect endangered species).
102 See Japan Waliug Ass'a., 478 U.S at 242. See generally David M. Driesen, The
Congressional Role in lnternationial E,,vironnental Law and Its hnplications for Statuttory
literpretation, 19 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 287 (1991) (discussing effect and importance of
environmental statutes); Ike C. Sugg, Caugit ii, the Act: Evaluating the Endangered Species Act,
Its Effects oi Man and Prospects for Reforiii, 24 CUMB. L. REV. 1 (1993-1994) (discussing
importance of Endangered Species Act).
103 Japan Whaling Ass'., 478 U.S. at 245 (emphasis in original).
104 See Japan Whaling Ass',., 478 U.S. at 246.
105 See id. at 249-50.
106 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
107 See 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1995).
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assert a continuing or present violation, but rejected Justice Scalia's
view that the Act, as construed by the Court, improperly "create[s] a
peculiar new form of subject-matter jurisdiction" in which plaintiffs
need not prove injury.108 According to Justice Scalia, a citizen
plaintiff must actually prove, not just allege, a present violation of
the Act in order to defeat a motion to dismiss for lack of standing.
Justice Marshall responded that the Act, in the Solicitor General's
words, "reflects a conscious sensitivity to the practical difficulties of
detecting and proving chronic episodic violations of environmental
standards," so that requiring proof of ongoing injury in order to
establish standing would hobble citizen suits severely.109 This view
has recently been adopted by the Court in Friends of the Earth v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services.110
In United States v. Dion,111 Justice Marshall, writing for a
unanimous Court, held killing a golden eagle, a crime under the
Endangered Species Act 1 2 and Eagle Protection Act, 113 was not
excused under treaties with Indian tribes. He found these statutes
protecting this threatened species showed a clear congressional
intent to abrogate whatever earlier treaty rights may have existed.
Again, in Clheical Manufacturers' Association v. Natural Resources
Defense Council,114 he wrote the dissent from a ruling that the EPA
could issue variances to industry from the Clean Water Act's
108 Gwaltiey, 484 U.S. at 67 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting; Justices O'Connor and
Stevens joined in this opinion). See also Mattoon v. City of Pittsfield, 980 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.
1992) (reaffirming Justice Marshall's interpretation of statute requiring citizen suits to have
"continuous or intermittent violation"). See generally Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)
(stating constitutional minimum for standing, "[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly
traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the
requested relief.").
109 See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 65 (citing Brief of United States 18); Gladstone Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979) (stating requirements for petitioner to satisfy
standing under Article Ill to "show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant"); North and South Rivers
Watershed Ass'n., Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 558 (1st Cir. 1991) (confirming notion
that literal enforcement of statute limiting citizen suits would not only be undesirable, it
would be absurd; stating "Court must strive to provide an alternative meaning that avoids the
irrational consequence").
110 528 U.S. 167 (2000); see Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204
F.3d 149, 154 (4th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing environmental cases from other kinds of litigation
over issue of standing, stating that in these cases "standing inquiry must reflect the context in
which the suit is brought."); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992)
(stating that "desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely aesthetic purposes, is
undeniably a cognizable interest for purposes of standing").
111 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
112 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1995).
113 See 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1995).
114 470 U.S. 116 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (5-4 decision).
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requirements controlling toxic pollutants.115 He argued that the
statute barred modifications in order to "most directly and
completely accomplish the congressional goal.., of an effective
toxic control program[.]"116 In a lengthy and vigorous dissent, he
noted that "when Congress has attached great importance to certain
environmental goals, we have disallowed exceptions even in the
absence of an explicit statutory ban."117
Similarly, Justice Marshall struck a major blow for energy
conservation in American Paper Institute, Inc. v. American Electric
Power Service Corp.,li8 by upholding the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission's rules requiring electric power producers to buy
power generated by independent producers at its true cost. This
decision greatly encouraged consumers to generate power, reducing
the need for costly and environmentally harmful power plant
construction. The rules halted the previous practice of utilities
refusing to buy excess power generated by independents, a great
barrier to independent production. As the Commission noted in a
statement relied on by the Court, "ratepayers and the nation as a
whole will benefit from the decreased reliance on scarce fossil fuels,
such as oil and gas, and the more efficient use of energy." 119
Justice Marshall's environmental opinions generally eschew
broad, impassioned generalities about the need for environmental
protection. Nonetheless, they demonstrate a powerful commitment
to those goals, expressed in a wide variety of decisions involving
most of the arenas of environmental law: air and water quality,
hazardous chemicals, endangered species, energy conservation, and
more. He clearly recognized the safeguarding of our natural
resources and environment as a major concern and consistently
115 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(1) (1995) (outlining required efficient limitations of pollutant
discharges); see also Chemical Mfr's Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 470 U.S. 116,
134-65 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that Court failed to consider plain meaning
interpretation and legislative history of Clean Water Act which prove Congress did not intend
to allow EPA to modify any requirement of statute).
116 Clheiical Mfr's, 470 U.S. at 142 (noting Congress' goal to keep environment safe from
toxic pollution even in consideration of high costs of abiding by strict pollutant control
standards).
117 See id. at 160 -(depicting when courts should defer to congressional intent, and citing
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)); see also DuPont v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 (1977) (pointing out
variances from Clean Water Act would be inappropriate).
118 461 U.S. 402 (1983) (holding that Federal Energy Regulatory Commission did not
exceed its authority in promulgating two rules regulating electric power companies for benefit
of environment).
119 See Americani Paper, 461 U.S. at 406 (citing Commission's order promulgating rule at
issue).
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wrote in support of efforts by both government and its citizens to
further those objectives. This was totally congruent with his
concerns over civil liberties and civil rights.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist was to eulogize Justice Marshall
as a "stout champion of individual rights."'120 Far less widely
acclaimed, but just as much a part of his fibre, was his devotion to
safeguarding our natural environment as George Orwell presciently
noted,121 a concern inextricably linked to protecting human rights.
120 JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 401 (1998) (noting
Marshall as proponent of both minority and individual rights); see also Warren E. Burger, A
Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1227, 1227 (1992) (depicting Marshall's
great achievements in civil rights); Jesse L. Jackson, Justice Tlurgood Marshall: Tile Struggle
Persouified, 35 How. L. J. 73, 73 (1991) (acknowledging Thurgood Marshall's great civil rights
work and expressing concern for void he left when he retired from Supreme Court).
121 See CRICK, suipra note 3, at 129, 303-04 (depicting Orwell's love of nature, its
importance, and inability of bureaucracy to interfere with it); see also MICHAEL SHELDEN,
ORWELL: THE AUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY 398 (1991) (noting Orwell's love of environment
through his writing on significance of trees).
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